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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

OPTIMIZING PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN HEALTH
CARE

ANNE MARIE HELM*
ABSTRACT
Americans are paying too much for health care services and insurance, in
large part due to insufficiently competitive markets. Waves of consolidation have
fortified providers and insurers with market power, resulting in higher prices
and lower quality for consumers. As antidotes, advocates have proposed various
legislative, regulatory, and enforcement solutions. Yet, unlike public antitrust
enforcement, private antitrust enforcement is either not mentioned or criticized
as sour grapes from competitors or a money grab by consumers. Instead of
ignoring or bashing private litigation, those looking to address the health care
pricing crisis in the United States should be looking to optimize it. Effective
private enforcement can restore competition, deter antitrust violations, and
compensate victims in the markets for health care services and insurance. For
plaintiffs, the key to optimizing private antitrust enforcement is overcoming the
unavoidable challenges in litigating these cases—from satisfying pleading
standards and establishing standing, to defining relevant markets. This article
explains the key obstacles involved in these cases and tracks recent and current
plaintiffs whose experiences provide insight.

* Chief of Staff to the Chancellor & Dean, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
Co-founder, The Source on Healthcare Price and Competition (sourceonhealthcare.org). Many
thanks to Jaime King, Tim Greaney, Josh Davis, and Corey Capps for their valuable input on this
project.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans are paying too much for health care services and insurance, in
large part due to insufficient competition among providers and payors. 1 Waves
of consolidation in these markets have fortified providers and insurers with
market power, resulting in higher prices and lower quality for consumers. 2 As
antidotes, health economists and other policy advocates have proposed various
legislative, regulatory, and enforcement solutions. 3 Yet private antitrust
enforcement is rarely recommended to remedy health care market dysfunction.
Whereas public antitrust enforcement is generally touted as indispensable,4
private antitrust enforcement is often disregarded as baseless, self-serving
litigation that only strains judicial resources and may even raise costs. 5 But the
notion that private litigation is important should not be controversial. 6 Private
1. MARTIN GAYNOR ET AL., MAKING HEALTH CARE MARKETS WORK: COMPETITION
POLICY FOR HEALTH CARE 1 (Apr. 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/
04/gaynor-et-al-final-report-v11.pdf.
2. See Robert Berenson, Acknowledging the Elephant: Moving Market Power and Prices to
the Center of Health Policy, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 3, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/
06/03/acknowledgingthe-elephant-moving-market-power-and-prices-to-the-center-of-health-poli
cy/; WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HOW HAS HOSPITAL
CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE? 1, 8 (Feb. 2006),
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2006/rwjf12056/subassets/rwjf12056_
1; MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE IMPACT OF
HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION—UPDATE 1–3 (June 2012), http://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/
2012/06/the-impact-of-hospital-consolidation.html; MARTIN GAYNOR ET AL., MAKING HEALTH
CARE MARKETS WORK: COMPETITION POLICY FOR HEALTH CARE 1 (Apr. 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/gaynor-et-al-final-report-v11.pdf;
Leemore Dafny et al., Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the US Health
Insurance Industry, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1161, 1163 (2012) (finding that health insurance
consolidation between 1998 and 2006 led to a seven percent increase in large group health
insurance premiums); José R. Guardado et al., The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Health
Insurers: A Case Study of UnitedHealth-Sierra, HEALTH MGMT., POL’Y & INNOVATION 8 (2013)
(finding the UnitedHealth Group and Sierra Health Services merger increased the post-merger
premiums in the Nevada markets by 13.7 percent, suggesting that the merging parties exploited the
market power gained from the merger); PAUL B. GINSBURG, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS.
CHANGE, WIDE VARIATION IN HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RATES EVIDENCE OF
PROVIDER MARKET POWER (Nov. 2010).
3. See, e.g., GAYNOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 17, 23, 28–29 (recommending: (1) changes to
laws on information sharing, certificate of need laws, and certificates of public advantage; (2) new
legislation banning anti-competitive contract clauses; and (3) increased federal and state antitrust
enforcement).
4. See, e.g., Edith Ramirez, Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care—Controlling Costs,
Improving Quality, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2245, 2245 (2014).
5. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden et al., Deterrence and Detection of Cartels: Using All the
Tools and Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 207, 227–34 (2011) (disputing Lande & Davis’s
findings).
6. See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private
Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 BYU L. REV. 315, 315
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antitrust enforcement can restore competition, deter antitrust violations, and
compensate victims in the markets for health care services and insurance, and,
accordingly, the United States should be looking for ways to optimize it.
When passed, the antitrust statutes envisioned private cases as a fundamental
part of an overall enforcement scheme. 7 Indeed, the treble damages remedy was
meant to spur private litigation. 8 The Supreme Court has acknowledged as
much: “By offering potential litigants the prospect of a recovery in three times
the amount of their damages, Congress encouraged these persons to serve as
‘private attorneys general.’” 9 The Court later elaborated, “The treble-damages
provision wielded by the private litigant is a chief tool in the antitrust
enforcement scheme, posing a crucial deterrent to potential violators.” 10 Over
the last century, private cases have greatly outnumbered public enforcement
actions. 11 Recently, however, “private actions have caught up in the well(2011) [hereinafter Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence] (arguing that private antitrust
litigation is more effective than Department of Justice (DOJ) criminal enforcement at deterring
cartels); Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, The Extraordinary Deterrence of Private Antitrust
Enforcement: A Reply to Werden, Hammond, and Barnett 58 ANTITRUST BULL. 173, 185–86
(2013) [hereinafter Lande & Davis, Extraordinary Deterrence].
7. The private right of action under the antitrust laws is (are) contained in Sections 4 and 16
of the Clayton Act, which apply respectively to actual and threatened injuries. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26
(2012). Section 4 provides: “[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). Under both provisions, the “antitrust laws” include the Sherman
and Clayton Acts. 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (2012). However, the “antitrust laws” do not include Section
3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (2012). This is distinct from the legal framework
in most other countries, as the United States provides some of the broadest access to private parties
in antitrust. See Kenneth Ewing, Private Anti-Trust Remedies Under US Law, 1 PLC CROSSBORDER COMPETITION HANDBOOK 87, 87 (2006–2007), https://www.steptoe.com/assets/attach
ments/2804.pdf. Many countries limit enforcement to governmental entities, and, where private
remedies are available, those remedies are typically more limited in scope. See Ewing, supra, at
87, 91; see also Nicholas Heaton & Benjamin Holt, Know-How: Private Litigation, GCR,
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/know-how/topics/1000309/private-litigation-2017
(last
visited Nov. 12, 2017) (providing a database of comparative international competition laws) (last
visited Dec. 12, 2017).
8. By statute, plaintiffs are entitled to the treble damages remedy, which provides for
recovery of “threefold the damages by [the plaintiff] sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney’s fee.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
9. Hawaii v. Std. Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) (“A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely
a private matter.”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 723 F.2d
155, 168 (1st Cir. 1983); American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., Inc. 391 F.2d
821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968)).
10. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 635.
11. Paul E. Godek, Does the Tail Wag the Dog?: Sixty Years of Government and Private
Antitrust in the Federal Courts, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1–3 (Dec. 2009), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Dec09_Godek12_17f.authcheckdam.pdf;
see also Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102
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orchestrated, ideologically driven ‘tort reform’ movement” and have been
characterized as “legalized blackmail” as opposed to a vital component of our
statutory antitrust scheme. 12 Private antitrust enforcement does not deserve this
characterization and indeed is a much needed means to address health care
pricing.
Antitrust law is premised on the notion that competition leads to lower costs,
higher-quality products and services, and encourages investment and
innovation. In health care, as former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chair
Edith Ramirez stated, “The success of health care reform in the United States
depends on the proper functioning of our market-based health care
system.” 13 Although highly regulated and somewhat complicated by the buyer
and seller relationships among patients, providers, and payors, health care in the
United States is nonetheless market-based. As such, the sector depends on
competition to drive prices down and quality up, even after the at-risk Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act. 14 There is a real need for more antitrust
enforcement in health care. As to hospital mergers, a named top public
enforcement priority, 15 the FTC has only challenged one percent of mergers over
the past decade. 16 And, even with both the FTC and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) enforcing the federal antitrust laws, the lower-priority cases challenging
anti-competitive conduct are even more scant, and criminal cases are rarer still. 17
COLUM. L. REV. 545, 585 (2002) (describing empirical study of antitrust cases in health care
between 1985 and 1999: “Of the 542 opinions in our sample, only 31 (representing 22 disputes)
involved cases brought by the DOJ (10 disputes), the FTC (11 disputes), or state attorneys general
(1 dispute)”).
12. Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Am. Antitrust Inst., Restoring the Legitimacy of
Private Enforcement, in A REPORT TO THE 45TH PRESIDENT (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1),
https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2017&context=all_fac.
13. Ramirez, supra note 4, at 2245.
14. The State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act’s Impact on Competition: Hearing on Serial No. 114-46 Before the Subcomm.
on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law, 114th Cong. 1, 3 (Sept. 10, 2015) (statement
of Thomas L. Greaney, Professor) (noting that the ACA “relies on (1) competitive bargaining
between payers and providers and (2) rivalry within each sector to drive price and quality to levels
that best serve the public”).
15. See Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at Hal White Antitrust
Conf. 1, 3–4 (June 9, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/3148
61/140609halwhite.pdf (exclusively discussing hospital merger enforcement in a speech on health
care and competition, including a historical discussion and specific discussion of recent Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) hospital merger victories).
16. Deborah L. Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, American
Antitrust Institute Health Care Roundtable: Competition & Health Care—Enforcement & Policy
Priorities 18 (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1120
623/feinstein_aai_speech_2-22-17.pdf.
17. See id.; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN
HEALTH CARE (Aug. 1996), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/00
00.pdf.
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In this void, private antitrust enforcement is essential to address market power
in health care, and one that assumes a role that public enforcement cannot—or
does not—presently fill. 18
The insufficiency of public enforcement to address antitrust concerns in
health care will likely only be exacerbated by the new presidential
administration, under which at least one commentator has noted that “it is fair to
expect some tempering of the level of activity that characterized the Obama
administration.” 19 Generally, Republican administrations are less likely to
intervene in transactions and challenge the conduct of businesses, and despite
some campaign rhetoric to the contrary, President Trump’s appointments seem
to indicate an approach more in line with the party than with a new populism. 20
Of course, political influence is not limited to the federal realm; in states, the
political priorities of elected attorneys general influence antitrust policy as well.
Nevertheless, even the most aggressive public enforcement scheme would be
incapable of addressing antitrust issues in health care without its private cousin.
What can private antitrust enforcement accomplish? Effective enforcement
achieves deterrence, compensates victims, 21 and maintains or restores
competition in health care markets. Private enforcement allows health care
entities to police their own markets and consumers to seek relief from anticompetitive acts. But it is often said that antitrust laws are meant to protect
competition and consumers, not competitors. 22 The concern is that entities,
acting in their own self-interest, will use the antitrust laws to try to modify
contracts, redress various business torts, stifle competition, and extort
settlements from rivals. 23 Despite criticisms that private suits are self-interested
and therefore anti-competitive, a lawsuit can be both self-interested and pro-

18. See Palmyra Park Hosp. Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Memorial Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1305
(11th Cir. 2010) (noting that due to limited resources, the government is not necessarily a better
plaintiff than a competitor).
19. Maria Raptis, Skadden Discusses Antitrust Enforcement in the Trump Administration, THE
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 19, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/04/19/skadden-dis
cusses-antitrust-enforcement-in-the-trump-administration/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
20. See id.
21. See Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 315–18 (arguing that
private antitrust litigation is more effective than DOJ criminal enforcement at deterring cartels);
Lande & Davis, Extraordinary Deterrence, supra note 6, at 174.
22. Marivin Ammori, Monopolies: Antitrust Law Protects Consumers, Not Competitors,
WIRED (Oct. 16, 2012, 3:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/10/antitrust-is-supposed-to-protect
-consumers-not-competitors/.
23. R. Preston McAfee et al., Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or
Anticompetitive?, ANTITRUST DOCUMENTS GROUP 2–5 (Dec. 1, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/
atr/private-antitrust-litigation-procompetitive-or-anticompetitive.
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competitive. 24 Indeed, the antitrust laws were written to take advantage of
private plaintiffs’ incentives and information to bring suits that benefit both
themselves and consumers.
Moreover, to limit the likelihood of abuse, courts have narrowed the per se
doctrine, increased standing requirements, 25 and augmented the pleading
standards; all of which deter frivolous, self-serving suits. In any event, studies
have shown that antitrust actions by competitors in more concentrated markets,
like health care markets, are more likely to be pro-competitive than they would
be in more dispersed industries. 26 Some would argue that these measures even
overdeter and overscreen. 27
How can private antitrust enforcement in health care be optimized? For
plaintiffs, the key is overcoming the challenges in pursuing antitrust cases in
health care. Those challenges fall into two groups: (1) those resulting from
policies designed to decrease the incidence of self-serving and/or frivolous suits,
and (2) those forming the essence of antitrust matters in health care.
Understanding both sets is essential to optimizing private antitrust enforcement
in health care. The first set requires plaintiffs to plead facts in light of new, more
demanding standards to demonstrate antitrust injury and to attempt to certify
classes of plaintiffs. The second set includes defining relevant markets and
selecting claims for a lawsuit. Understanding the sources of these obstacles and
how other recent plaintiffs have (or have failed to) overcome them is essential
to optimizing private enforcement’s role in addressing the competition problems
in health care.
This article contains three parts. Part II describes how plaintiffs typically use
private enforcement in health care services and insurance markets. Part III
addresses the common challenges involved in private antitrust actions in health
care and suggests strategies based on recent cases.
II. HOW PLAINTIFFS USE PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN HEALTH
CARE SERVICES AND INSURANCE MARKETS
Some practitioners and scholars have termed antitrust a “judicial
enforcement (or ‘law enforcement’) model” because “the Sherman and Clayton
Acts . . . creat[e] a species of common law, the meaning of which can evolve
with changing conditions, which gives the federal courts a critical role in
24. See, e.g., Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1509-Orl-37DAB, 2015
WL 275806, at *7–8, *10 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015) (holding that plaintiff whose interests
overlapped with the public interest in competition among health care providers had standing).
25. See William Kolasky, Antitrust Litigation: What’s Changed in Twenty-Five Years?, 27
ANTITRUST 9, 9–10, 12–13 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court’s changes to the antitrust
standing requirement with the Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat decision in 1977 put an end
to the increase in number of antitrust suits (after a quadrupling in the decade prior)).
26. McAfee et al., supra note 23, at 12.
27. See Lande & Davis, supra note 12, at 1–2.
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fashioning our competition laws.” 28 Accordingly, the development of antitrust
law is a dynamic process that takes into account changing conditions for which
the role of the federal courts cannot be understated. 29 Health care markets are
certainly an area in which market conditions have changed over time, and courts
and litigants have responded. Under these conditions, plaintiffs have evolved
into litigants who prototype claims and analyses, not always certain how their
experiments will turn out. The large majority of cases in this realm are brought
under the Sherman Act, challenging either unilateral or concerted conduct, 30 or
under Clayton Act Section 3, which proscribes exclusive dealing. 31
Notwithstanding, some private litigants have brought merger challenges under
Clayton Act Section 7, although informational asymmetries and injunctive
remedies based on potential—as opposed to actual—damages discourage most
plaintiffs from bringing these cases. 32 Occasionally, a Clayton Act claim of an
impermissible merger is just one claim of many in a private suit alleging a

28. Mark S. Popofsky & Douglas H. Halward-Driemeier, Antitrust and the Roberts Court, 28
ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 26, 26. Plaintiffs typically sue under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012), and the Clayton Act, id. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012). In addition,
most states (all but Pennsylvania) have antitrust statutes that are largely coextensive with federal
law. See Dan Packel, Pa. Sen. Proposes Antitrust Law as State Lags Behind Others, LAW360 (Mar.
15, 2013, 5:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/424213/pa-sen-proposes-antitrust-law-asstate-lags-behind-others (last visited Feb. 2, 2018). Further, many state antitrust statutes include a
provision providing that federal antitrust precedents should be used as a guide in interpreting the
state’s antitrust laws. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.17 (1974) (Construction of Chapter) (“This
chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purposes in harmony with judicial
interpretation of comparable federal statutory provisions.”).
29. Popofsky & Halward-Driemeier, supra note 28, at 26.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).
31. Id. § 14.
32. The government typically has more information about upcoming mergers in light of the
federal merger pre-notification program created in 1976 by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2012). Parties planning mergers of a certain size must notify
the FTC and the DOJ (the antitrust agencies) in advance of proposed deals. Lisl Dunlop & Shoshana
Speiser, Merger Control in the United States: Overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW
(June 1, 2017), https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb49d8761cb511e38578f7ccc38dc
bee/View/FullText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bh
cp=1. After filing the required pre-merger notification forms, the entities may not complete the deal
until the waiting period expires, the antitrust agencies terminate the waiting period early, or until
they participate in a more extensive review following a “Second Request” for more information.
Id. However, occasionally private plaintiffs file merger challenges and the FTC or DOJ follows.
See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 782 (9th
Cir. 2015), aff’g 2014 WL 407446 (D. Idaho 2014); Bruce D. Sokler et al., Hospital Wins First
Round Against Largest Rival in Antitrust Suit Alleging Illegal Exclusive Dealing Agreements with
Insurers, HEALTH CARE ANTITRUST ALERT (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.mintz.com/newsletter/
2015/Advisories/4811-0315-NAT-AFR-HC/ (“It will likely be a historical footnote that the FTC’s
seminal St. Luke’s case began as private litigation brought by a rival hospital before the FTC or the
Idaho Attorney General ever showed up.”).
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scheme of monopolization and exclusive dealing arrangements in providerinsurer contracts. 33
In light of the breadth and flexibility of the antitrust statutes, the same facts
that give rise to an antitrust lawsuit often give rise to other claims. For example,
a hospital suing another hospital and insurer based on provisions contained in
the defendants’ contracts might bring the suit as a conspiracy in restraint of trade
under Sherman Act Section 1, which may involve allegations of exclusive
dealing arrangements, tying, a group boycott or concerted refusal to deal, and/or
as a monopolization or conspiracy to monopolize case that describes the same
conduct. The recent fact patterns of several cases in this area are described
below:
A.

Providers as Plaintiffs
• A surgical hospital sues a larger hospital(s) and/or insurer, and/or
managed care organization alleging the defendants acted to keep it out of
the market for surgical services by conspiring or illegally contracting with
other providers and/or insurers. 34
• Physician groups sue a health care corporation comprised of hospital and
insurance plan alleging the health care giant used its market power, gained
in part from anti-competitive mergers, to obtain exclusive referral
arrangements aimed at eliminating competitors. 35
• A specialty practice sues a hospital and an insurer for forming a Health
Maintenance Organization (HMO) and excluding the specialty practice
from the HMO’s network. 36
• Providers and insurance subscribers sue a large insurance company
alleging horizontal market allocation. 37
• A large hospital sues a competitor hospital alleging that the competitor,
the only local provider of essential services, used its status as a “must-

33. See Third Amended Complaint at 64, 66, 70, 73, 77, 80, 84, 88, 92, Omni Healthcare, Inc.
v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13-CV-01509-RBD-DAB (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2014).
34. See, e.g., Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys., 817 F.3d 934, 936 (6th
Cir. 2016); Arapahoe Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1260–61
(D. Colo. 2015); Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d
1257, 1263–64 (D. Kan. 2007); Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of
Tangipahoa Par., 309 F.3d 836, 838 (5th Cir. 2002); Marion HealthCare LLC v. S. Ill. Healthcare,
2013 WL 4510168, at *1–2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 26. 2013).
35. Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13-CV-1509-ORL-37DAB, 2015 WL
275806, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015); N.M. Oncology and Hematology Consultants v.
Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 54 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1197 (D.N.M. 2014).
36. Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2009).
37. In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-CV-20000-RDP, 2017 WL
2797267, at *2, *6 (N.D. Ala. 2017).
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have” participating provider to obtain exclusive dealing arrangements
with commercial health insurers. 38
• A hospital sues a competitor hospital alleging the competitor “leveraged
a state-granted monopoly in certain medical services” to exclude the
hospital from local insurance companies’ provider networks by tying
favorable insurance reimbursement rates for monopolized services to a
refusal to include the plaintiff hospital in the insurance companies’
networks. 39
• A large hospital with its own health plan sues a large insurance company
alleging the insurance company attempted to block both the hospital’s
acquisition of a general acute care community hospital and its entry into
the insurance market. 40
B.

Payors as Plaintiffs
• An insurance company sues a competitor insurance company for using
most favored nations clauses in insurer-provider contracts alleging that
the exclusionary clauses drove up health care costs and inhibited
competition. 41
• Self-funded payors sue a large hospital alleging it overpaid for health
insurance because of contracts with insurance entities that contained anticompetitive provisions. 42

C. Consumers as Plaintiffs
• Purchasers of commercial health insurance sue a large hospital alleging
the hospital overpaid for health insurance because of provider-insurer
contracts that contained anti-competitive provisions that require the
38. Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 859 F.3d 408, 409–10 (7th Cir.
2017); Complaint at 1–2, Marion HealthCare, LLC v. S. Ill. Healthcare, No. 3:12-cv-00871-JPGPMF (S.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2012).
39. Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir.
2010).
40. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of R.I., 997 F. Supp. 2d 142,
148–49 (D.R.I. 2014).
41. Aetna, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 11–15346, 2012 WL 2184568, at *1
(E.D. Mich. June 14, 2012). This lawsuit was a “follow-on” case to the government case of United
States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, which the government voluntarily dismissed after the
Michigan state legislature passed a law banning most favored nations clauses in provider-insurer
contracts. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Files Motion to
Dismiss Antitrust Lawsuit Against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan After Michigan Passes Law
to Prohibit Health Insurers from Using Most Favored Nation Clauses in Provider Contracts (Mar.
25, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-motion-dismiss-antitrust-law
suit-against-blue-cross-blue-shield (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
42. UFCW & Emp’rs Benefit Tr. v. Sutter Health, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 193 (Cal. Ct. App.
2015).
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insurer to buy all or none of the hospital’s services and/or prevent insurer
from steering patients to lower-priced providers. 43
• Individual and small-employer customers sue a large insurance company
alleging horizontal market allocation. 44
These lawsuits, which seek to combat the effects of market power in health
care services and insurance markets, have sprung up in response to the growing
consolidation in those markets, and, accordingly, are a relatively recent
phenomenon. As a consequence, there is no set structure for a complaint; rather,
each plaintiff tends to select claims based on case-specific facts and litigation
strategy. Nonetheless, all plaintiffs must deal with the following key challenges
in litigating their cases.
III. KEY CHALLENGES
A.

Policy-Driven Challenges

The first key set of challenges plaintiffs face in private antitrust suits are
those which result from “tort reform,” a term that generally refers to changes to
the civil justice system to reduce the number of cases filed by plaintiffs, the
number of cases that survive past the earliest stages of litigation, and/or the
amount of damages plaintiffs receive. 45 Though not based on tort statutes, courts
in private antitrust cases have imposed the same types of limiting mechanisms
that ostensibly seek to deter or dispense frivolous lawsuits. In antitrust cases, tort
reform changes began in the late 1970s when, after early enthusiasm by
Congress and the courts over private litigants’ role as “private attorneys
general,” 46 the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that reined in private
antitrust suits by narrowing the per se doctrine and tightening standing
requirements. 47 After years of abridgment, today the per se rule only extends to
“‘naked’ price fixing and market division agreements, a small subset of boycotts,
or concerted refusals to deal, and—by a very thin thread—some tying
43. Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 51 F. Supp. 3d 870, 872–75 (N.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d, 667 F. App’x
641 (9th Cir. 2016); Complaint at 2, DiCesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 2017 WL
1359599 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2017) (No. 2016 CVS 16404).
44. In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 2797267 (N.D. Ala. 2017); In re
Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 26 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1179–81 (N.D. Ala. 2014).
45. See, e.g., Tort Reform, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
46. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); accord Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) (“A claim under the antitrust
laws is not merely a private matter.”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc. 723 F.2d 155, 168 (1st Cir. 1983); Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,
Inc. 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968)).
47. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). Around
that time, the Supreme Court also began to limit the per se doctrine, which gives a stronger
presumption of unreasonableness to certain restraints on trade. See William Kolasky, Antitrust
Litigation: What’s Changed in Twenty-Five Years, 27 ANTITRUST 9, 11 (2012).
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arrangements.” 48 More recently, in the early 2000s, in response to perceived
abuses by the plaintiffs’ bar in the form of large class actions, the Supreme Court
revised antitrust pleading requirements and then all federal pleading
requirements to prevent meritless cases from proceeding to discovery. 49 As a
result, all plaintiffs in health care antitrust cases face certain procedural obstacles
as they navigate a system designed to winnow out cases at the earliest stages.
1. Per se versus Rule of Reason
The per se rule is the judicially created concept that some antitrust violations
are so inherently illegal that plaintiffs need to plead and prove only that the
conduct occurred;50 the anti-competitive effects are implied. After a high point
in the mid-twentieth century, when numerous antitrust offenses received per se
treatment, the doctrine has been increasingly limited, either by express
overruling or increased dubiousness. 51 Instead, the rule of reason, “which
requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that defendants with market power have
engaged in anticompetitive conduct,” 52 has become the dominant rubric of
judicial analysis. Under the rule of reason, the court conducts a balancing inquiry
that determines whether the alleged restraint is reasonable, and, if so, it passes
antitrust scrutiny. 53 Matters are further complicated for litigants by the fact that
it is not always clear whether a case will receive per se or rule of reason treatment
until close to its resolution. A plaintiff who arrives at summary judgment having
declined to prove a case under the rule of reason takes a significant risk 54
because the court could ultimately decide not to apply per se treatment at
summary judgment:
[I]f there is any reasonable chance that the court will ultimately require the rule
of reason, the plaintiff has no choice but to proceed through discovery under that
rule even if the chance is small. This means that the value of the per se rule is
lost in a significant number of cases, because the plaintiff must do all of the
things that rule of reason analysis requires, including developing expert
testimony on questions about relevant market, market power, and
anticompetitive effects, even though the case may ultimately be decided under
the per se rule. At least prior to trial, the greatest cost in litigating a rule of reason

48. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, PENN L.: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY
1, 2 (July 2017), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2780&context=fac
ulty_scholarship (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
49. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 559 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678–79, 684 (2009).
50. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
51. Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 41.
52. Id. at 2.
53. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 380–81 (3d ed. 2010).
54. See Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 9.
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case is the cost of developing a record, so most of the cost savings that the per
se rule promises will have been lost. 55

In recognition of this predicament, most plaintiffs err on the side of putting
together a case that anticipates rule of reason analysis.
In health care, some plaintiffs who have recently pursued exclusively per se
cases have failed to convince the court of this course, warning future plaintiffs
of the risks of such a strategy. For example, in one of the cases related to most
favored nations clauses in provider-insurer contracts in Michigan, the plaintiff
lost a motion to dismiss after committing to a per se pleading strategy. 56 A
number of other district courts have likewise made clear that vertical
arrangements, including contracts and agreements between hospitals and
insurers that are often the subject of lawsuits in this arena, receive rule of reason
treatment. 57 More recently, in Medical Center at Elizabeth Place v. Premier
Health Partners, a hospital plaintiff, MCEP, that sued the partners of competitor
hospital group’s joint venture, claiming the joint venture was a conspiracy to
orchestrate a group boycott (a “non-venture”) to exclude the plaintiff from
managed care contracts, physicians, and funding, lost at summary judgment
because of its per se case. 58 The district court declined to offer per se treatment
to the allegations noting that the Supreme Court had a presumption of rule of
reason analysis particularly with regard to vertical restraints in antitrust cases
and quoted the Supreme Court’s admonition that “easy labels do not always
supply ready answers.” 59 As part of its lengthy analysis, the district court seemed
somewhat swayed by the fact that one of the main restraints at issue in the case
the “panel limitations” clause in contracts between the joint venture member

55. Id. at 10.
56. City of Pontiac v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 11–10276, 2012 WL 1079895, at
*8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2012).
57. Marion Healthcare, LLC v. S. Ill. Healthcare, No. 12-CV-00871-DRH-PMF, 2013 WL
4510168, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2013) (agreeing with the defendant that rule of reason is
appropriate for a case challenging allegedly exclusionary contracts between defendant hospital and
insurer); Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., No. 1:13-cv-01054-SLD-JEH,
2015 WL 1399229, at *4, *8 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015) (deciding ultimately on foreclosure grounds
under a rule of reason analysis at summary judgment); see also Prime Healthcare Servs., Inc. v.
Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, No. 11-cv-2652-GPC-RBB, 2013 WL 3873074, at *11 (S.D. Cal. July 25,
2013), aff’d, 642 F. App’x 665 (9th Cir. 2016); Rheumatology Diagnostics Lab., Inc. v. Aetna, Inc.,
No. 12–cv–05847–JST, 2013 WL 3242245, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2013).
58. Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC. v. Premier Health Partners, No. 3:12-cv-26, 2017 WL
3433131, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2017).
59. Id. at *2 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8
(1979)). This case’s loss was particularly tragic for the plaintiff because, after winning on appeal
to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which overturned the district court’s ruling on summary
judgment that the defendants were a single entity and therefore incapable of a conspiracy, they
returned to district court, only to lose because their case was brought under the per se rule instead
of the rule of reason. See id. at *1, *6.
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hospital defendants and their contracted insurers was a vertical, as opposed to
horizontal, restraint. 60 That clause provided that if the insurer were to add other
hospitals to its provider network, the hospital would have the option to terminate
the contract or renegotiate its rates for health care services. 61 Plaintiff MCEP
argued that the restraint deserved per se treatment because the restraint’s
operation excluded the plaintiff, a horizontal competitor, from the market, which
the court concluded was too far of a logical leap. 62
The obvious takeaway is that even for a conspiracy case among horizontal
competitors, like the group boycott and especially one that involves providerinsurer contracts, as so many of these cases do, the plan should be to plead and
prove the case under a rule of reason rubric. Thus, even when pleading these
cases as conspiracies (as is often the case), 63 plaintiffs should be prepared to
establish all facets of a rule of reason case. 64 Because, as the court pointed out
in Elizabeth Place, the restraints at issue are often vertical, even when an alleged
horizontal conspiracy is involved (e.g., competitor hospital alleges that rival
hospitals conspired to exclude it from the market by obtaining exclusivity from
all local insurers), the likelihood of obtaining per se treatment is low. 65 Given
the importance of surviving beyond the pleading stage of private litigation, this
strategy is even more salient.
2. Twiqbal
Despite developing after the antitrust standing doctrine, new pleading
standards affect all elements of a plaintiff’s case, including standing; this article
will discuss them first. In 2007, and again in 2009, the Supreme Court
overhauled the federal civil pleading standards for the first time in sixty years,
raising the bar considerably for surviving a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim. 66 Prior to 2007, the federal pleading standard under Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP Rule 8) required a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 67 The
Supreme Court’s longstanding interpretation of FRCP Rule 8 was that it required
60. Id. at *14.
61. Id.
62. Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, 2017 WL 3433131, at *14.
63. See, e.g., id. at *4; Arapahoe Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d
1257, 1261 (D. Colo. 2015); Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., 527
F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1263 (D. Kan. 2007).
64. Plaintiffs must establish the following: (1) the defendants conspired; (2) the conspiracy
produced anti-competitive effects in the relevant product and geographic markets; (3) the conduct
was illegal; and (4) the scheme was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s antitrust injury. Med. Ctr.
at Elizabeth Place, 2017 WL 3433131, at *3.
65. Id. at *15.
66. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 684 (2009).
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (2016).
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“notice pleading”—i.e., “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state
a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 68 The deferential “no
set of facts” standard—in place from 1957 to 2007—gave the benefit of the
doubt to the plaintiff, who, as a matter of policy, was presumed to bring a legally
viable claim unless such claim was essentially inconceivable under the facts
alleged in the complaint.
This changed in 2007 in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly when the Supreme
Court ruled that to plead a Sherman Act Section 1 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff
must give the court “plausible grounds to infer an agreement” by filing “a
complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an
agreement was made.” 69 At first, the new plausibility standard was limited to
antitrust conspiracy claims under the Sherman Act. Then, two years later in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court extended the plausibility standard to all federal
claims brought under Rule 8 in federal court and provided further guidance for
applying the new standard. 70 The cases are often discussed and cited together
and have even been given the moniker Twiqbal as a shorthand.
The policy behind the Twombly decision was to rein in the perceived misuse
of the courts by private litigants, especially through class action attorneys, filing
baseless lawsuits aimed at lucrative damages awards or, more commonly,
settlements. 71 Twombly was part of a larger effort by the Supreme Court to
discourage the proliferation of large class action suits based on thinly pled
allegations. The Court cited repeatedly to its decision of two years prior in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo in which it required a higher showing of
causation at the pleading stage in securities fraud cases, and Twombly made
sense in that context. 72 The Court’s extension of Twombly’s new rule to all
federal claims two years later in Iqbal was both much more expansive and more
fraught with controversy. For starters, unlike Twombly, Iqbal was not a class
action nor an antitrust case nor even a case involving allegations of corporate
malfeasance; instead, it was a Bivens action, which is an individual’s suit against

68. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–47 (1957) (emphasis added), abrogated by Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
69. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added).
70. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684.
71. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557–59 (“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious
defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings. Probably, then, it is only
by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to
avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no ‘reasonably founded hope
that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence’ to support a § 1 claim.”) (alteration in
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)).
72. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346–47 (2005); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557,
557–59, 562 (citing Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 346, 347).
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a federal officer alleged to have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 73 In
other words, whereas Twombly fit the mold of the type of case criticized as an
instance of opportunistic plaintiffs’ lawyers suing deep-pocketed corporate
defendants hoping for a settlement, Iqbal most certainly did not. The plaintiffrespondent Iqbal had been detained in connection with investigations into the
September 11, 2001, attacks and had filed suit against multiple federal
officials. 74 In addition, the Supreme Court held that Twombly applied to all
federal pleadings, and “facts” that were nothing more than legal conclusions
would no longer suffice in federal pleading; instead, “only a complaint that states
a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” 75 The Court then
explained the new process lower courts should use: “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” 76 In other words, the new plausibility standard was both flexible and
subjective. Critics argued that the purpose of the FRCP, enacted almost seventy
years earlier, was to increase ordinary citizens’ access to the federal courts by
simplifying the historically more technical code pleading, which Iqbal directly
contravened. 77
Opinions about the actual effects of the new plausibility standards on federal
cases are varied. A major study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center in 2011
concluded that on the whole “Twombly and Iqbal have had a modest effect on
the resolution of Rule 12(b)(6) motions.” 78 Other studies likewise have found
no statistically significant effect on dismissal rates. 79 However, studies focused
on dismissal rates may ignore “selection effects,” meaning the deterrent effects
on plaintiffs who may decide not to file a case at all in light of the new

73. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668, 676.
74. Id. at 668 (naming as defendants: John Ashcroft, the former Attorney General of the
United States, and Robert Mueller, then Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation).
75. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
76. Id. (citing the decision on appeal from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Iqbal
v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2007)).
77. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 9–10 (2010) (“Federal civil procedure has been
politicized and subjected to ideological pressures. Thus, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal should be seen as the latest steps in a longterm trend that has favored increasingly early case disposition in the name of efficiency, economy,
and avoidance of abusive and meritless lawsuits. It also marks a continued retreat from the
principles of citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment
in favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth. To a significant degree, the liberalprocedure ethos of 1938 has given way to a restrictive one.”) (footnotes omitted).
78. Kevin R. Reich, Five Years After Twombly: Where Are We Now?, 10 ABA ANTITRUST
SEC. JOINT CONDUCT COMMITTEE E-BULL. no. 1, 2012, at 2.
79. William H. J. Hubbard, The Effects of Twombly and Iqbal, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
474, 475 (2017).
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plausibility requirement. 80 And aggregate effects aside, plaintiffs are required to
plead their cases in light of the new standard, which comes up in courts’ standing
analyses as well as substantive considerations like market definition, discussed
in Part III.
3. Antitrust Standing
Antitrust standing, a creature of the common law, imposes a more onerous
showing than its older cousin, constitutional standing. 81 Of course, plaintiffs in
antitrust suits also must have Article III standing to bring their cases,82 but the
inquiry is usually collapsed into one “antitrust standing” analysis, whose
requirements are often distilled into two prongs: A plaintiff must show (1) he
has suffered antitrust injury and (2) that he is an efficient enforcer, i.e., the
appropriate plaintiff to bring suit. 83 First, the antitrust injury requirement
ensures both that the defendant harmed competition or markets (and not just the
plaintiff, in a more tort-like sense) and that the plaintiff was injured in fact either
as a direct market participant or as being “inextricably intertwined” with the
harm resulting from the anti-competitive scheme. 84 Next, the efficient enforcer
requirement ensures that the plaintiff be not too remote, i.e., has suffered directly
from the defendant’s conduct, 85 and is therefore the best plaintiff to bring suit;
otherwise the best plaintiff might try to sue later on (potentially after damages
have been awarded to the inferior plaintiff).

80. Id. at 476.
81. See generally Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see
also John J. Miles, HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW, § 9:7 n.4 (2017) (collecting cases).
82. See Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury: Down
the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273, 288 n.104 (1998) (citing
Sanner v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 62 F.3d 918, 922–27 (7th Cir. 1995); Malamud v. Sinclair Oil
Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1152 (6th Cir. 1975)).
83. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 535 n.31 (1983); Miles, supra note 81, at § 9:7 n.4.
84. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 483–84 (1982) (noting that although the
plaintiff was not a competitor or customer of the defendant, the plaintiff’s injury was “inextricably
intertwined” with the injury the defendants intended to inflict on the market and others, i.e., it
“‘flow[ed] from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful’ within the meaning of Brunswick,
and [fell] squarely within the area of congressional concern”).
85. See Jacobson & Greer, supra note 82, at 288. The danger of allowing recovery by a remote
plaintiff is that a more directly injured plaintiff would later sue, and the defendant would be put at
risk of another set of damages. Examples of ill-suited antitrust plaintiffs who typically cannot meet
the standing requirement “include officers, employees, shareholders, prospective shareholders,
creditors, guarantors, distributors, brokers, sales representatives, and suppliers of businesses injured
by the violation.” Miles, supra note 81, at § 9:7.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

OPTIMIZING PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN HEALTH CARE

21

a. Antitrust Injury
Following an uptick in antitrust cases filed by competitors in the midtwentieth century, courts became concerned that businesses were using the
antitrust statutes as federal business tort statutes unrelated to competition or
consumers. In response, in 1977, the Supreme Court clarified in Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc. that to use the Clayton Act’s private right of
action, a plaintiff must show “antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants’ acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect
either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the
violation.” 86 In Brunswick, the Court echoed the seminal Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, explaining: “The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for ‘the
protection of competition, not competitors.’” 87 The Supreme Court further
clarified in 1990 that antitrust injury required some showing of public harm. 88
The issues of relative injury to the plaintiff and competition have come up in
two recent antitrust cases brought by hospitals. In Methodist Health Services
Corp. vs. OSF Healthcare System, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant, expressing doubt over the
plaintiff’s contention that it had brought its case to restore competition on behalf
of multiple injured parties, none of whom were party to the lawsuit, and
concluded that the plaintiff was “simply an unsuccessful competitor.” 89 On the
other hand, in another recently settled district court case, Omni Healthcare, Inc.
v. Health First, Inc., the district court in Florida made clear it would redress
injuries that were more personal to the plaintiff so long as those injuries
coincided with an injury to competition and also resulted from the same conduct
of the defendant. 90 Plaintiffs also must show that they suffered direct harm; such
harm is presumed for competitors and direct customers but not for those who are
not participants in the relevant antitrust market. 91 Some courts include this
analysis when considering a plaintiff’s remoteness in the antitrust injury prong,
determining whether the plaintiff was “inextricably intertwined” with the harm
resulting from the defendant’s conduct, whereas other courts do an almost
identical analysis under the “efficient enforcer” prong, discussed below.

86. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). Brunswick was a
Clayton Act case, but subsequent Supreme Court cases made clear that the Brunswick rule applied
equally to cases under the Sherman Act. See Blue Shield of Va., 457 U.S. at 482 (applying the
antitrust injury rule to a claim brought under Sherman I); Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,
495 U.S. 328, 334–335 (1990) (holding that antitrust injury is an essential element of every private
antitrust case, irrespective of the substantive theory of liability); see also Jacobson & Greer, supra
note 82, at 282.
87. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 488 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
320 (1962)). This definition of “antitrust injury” was extended to Section 16 cases for injunctive
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b. Efficient Enforcer
For the purpose of antitrust standing analysis, the law favors direct
consumers or customers as plaintiffs. 92 Notwithstanding that preference, in
determining whether the plaintiff is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws,
courts in the health care cases at issue vary in their rigidity of applying a
presumption in favor of a customer or competitor in light of the particular
characteristics and constituents of those health care markets. As described in
Part II, recent cases in this arena have seen plaintiffs as the following: hospitals,
ambulatory surgery centers, physician groups, insurance companies, insurance
subscribers, and patients. One recent district court clarified that “[t]here is no
‘bright-line rule’ for determining whether a plaintiff is an efficient enforcer,”
and instead of strictly assessing the role played by the plaintiff in the market at
issue, “the ‘efficient enforcer’ requirement ensures that the ‘particular plaintiff
will efficiently vindicate the goals of the antitrust laws.’” 93 Moreover, in cases
where a plaintiff is not a customer or competitor precisely because of being
excluded from the market by the defendant’s anti-competitive conduct, courts
are cognizant that to deny standing on that basis would be inconsistent with the
policy behind the antitrust laws. 94 Finally, courts have demonstrated awareness
of “efficient enforcer” issues that are inherent in the structure of health care
markets, where patients may be customers of insurance companies but not of
providers, who receive payment directly from insurers instead of patients and,
in such a scenario, have recognized the antitrust standing of insurance plan
relief in 1986. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986); see also CHRISTINE
L. WHITE ET AL., ANTITRUST AND HEALTHCARE: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 61 (2013).
88. Atl. Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 334; see also Jacobson & Greer, supra note 82, at 284.
89. Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 859 F.3d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 2017).
90. Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13–CV–1509–ORL-37DAB, 2015 WL
275806, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015) (citing Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438,
1450 (11th Cir. 1991)).
91. Blue Shield of Va., 457 U.S. at 472, 480, 483–84 (noting that although the plaintiff was
not a competitor or customer of the defendant, the plaintiff’s injury was “inextricably intertwined”
with the injury the defendants intended to inflict on the market and others, i.e., it “‘flow[ed] from
that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful’ within the meaning of Brunswick, and [fell] squarely
within the area of congressional concern”).
92. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 544–545 (1983); Miles, supra note 81, at § 9:7 n.4.
93. Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13–CV–1509–ORL-37DAB, 2015 WL
275806, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015) (quoting Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d
1438, 1452 (11th Cir. 1991)).
94. See, e.g., Steward Health Care Sys., LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 997 F. Supp.
2d 142, 160 (D.R.I. 2014) (“To permit the defendant in an unlawful exclusion case to hide behind
the presumptive disfavoring of non-market participants would subject plaintiffs in such cases to an
insurmountable Catch–22. Were courts to observe a blanket prohibition on claims brought by those
excluded from the market by alleged anticompetitive conduct, those firms responsible for the
exclusion might never be held accountable.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

OPTIMIZING PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN HEALTH CARE

23

subscribers to sue a provider who contracts with their insurance company. 95
Defendants have largely been unsuccessful in using the Indirect Purchaser Rule,
or Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois Doctrine, which states that only direct purchasers
may sue for antitrust violations in these cases. 96
In the recent case Palmyra Park Hospital, Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Memorial
Hospital, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the district court’s
dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiff hospital was not an “efficient
enforcer,” and therefore the plaintiff lacked standing. 97 In that case between two
competing Georgia hospitals, Palmyra alleged that Phoebe Putney had used its
monopoly power (state-granted by way of a certificate of need) to demand that
Blue Cross and other insurers exclude Palmyra from their provider networks. 98
Specifically, Palmyra claimed that Phoebe Putney tied favorable reimbursement
rates to a refusal to include Palmyra in those networks so that insurers who
included Palmyra in their networks would have to pay Phoebe Putney more for
the same health care services. 99 The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis focused on the
particular features of health care markets, which led to the holding that Palmyra
is not only an efficient enforcer but also an ideal plaintiff to bring this suit. 100
Whereas the district court had concluded that “[t]he most direct affect [sic] of
Defendants’ alleged anticompetitive conduct would be felt by the allegedly
coerced insurers who pay higher reimbursement rates and the patients who
ultimately pay higher premiums and co-pays for medical services,” 101 the
appellate court, after analyzing the incentives at play, concluded that those
insurers had suffered little harm and therefore were unlikely plaintiffs. 102 In fact,
once the tie was in place (i.e., Blue Cross and others agreed to exclude Palmyra
from its networks in exchange for better reimbursement rates), 103 it is unclear
that the insurers would be paying higher rates at all, and to the extent they were,
the cost could easily be passed on to their subscribers. Thus, the insurers had

95. See, e.g., Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 4 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1173 n.7, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(dismissing second amended complaint on other grounds).
96. See, e.g., id. at 1173 n.7 (noting that patients who sued hospital based on its allegedly
competitive contracts with the insurers whose health plans plaintiffs subscribed to had standing);
cf. Med. Sav. Ins. Co. v. HCA, Inc., No. 2:04CV156FTM-29DNF, 2005 WL 1528666, at *2, *8
(M.D. Fla. June 24, 2005) (involving an insurance company that had no contracts with hospitals
and just paid amounts of charges it deemed “reasonable” that sued hospitals for conspiracy to
boycott; citing Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977), the court said patients were the
more efficient enforcer), aff’d, 186 Fed. App’x 919 (11th Cir. 2006).
97. Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir.
2010).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1296.
100. Id. at 1306.
101. Id. at 1303–04 (quoting lower court opinion).
102. Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc., 604 F.3d at 1305.
103. Id. at 1302–03.
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questionable damages and little incentive to sue, and their subscribers likewise
may or may not have had damages in the form of increased premiums—and
organizing and determining this harm would be difficult and likely prohibitive
to filing suit. 104 The most significant effect of the arrangement between Phoebe
Putney and the insurers was an incentive change for patients: Patients had the
incentive to go to in-network hospital Phoebe Putney and not out-of-network
Palmyra because of how insurance companies reimburse for hospital charges. 105
No patient would be willing to pay out of pocket for similar treatment at an outof-network hospital, so the contracting arrangement took away demand from
Palmyra—so much so that the hospital experienced a drop in revenue from
twenty-four million dollars to six million dollars. 106 Indeed, the Third Circuit
held that “[a]s Phoebe Putney’s chief competitor, Palmyra is undoubtedly well
suited to vindicate these harms.” 107
c. Special Considerations in Health Care
In some recent health care antitrust cases, defendants accused of harming
competition through arrangements that artificially depress prices have argued
that lower prices benefit, as opposed to harm, consumers. 108 This argument fails
generally because antitrust injury includes harms that result from conspiracies
to lower prices in contravention of fair and open competition. 109 But in health
care cases, courts have also specifically pointed out that diminishment of quality
and limitation of access are key in the health care analysis, as patient decisions
are not made based on price to the same extent that they are in other markets for
goods and services. 110 For example, in the Third Circuit’s reversal in West Penn
Allegheny Health System, Inc. v. UPCM, provider West Penn sued competitor
provider UPMC and insurer Highmark for various antitrust violations, including
those related to UPMC and Highmark’s agreement that Highmark, who also had
a business relationship with plaintiff West Penn, was “not to do anything to
benefit West Penn financially.” 111 Pursuant to that agreement, the complaint
alleged that West Penn had asked Highmark to renegotiate and raise its rates. It
104. See id. at 1305.
105. See id. at 1304.
106. Id. at 1302–03.
107. Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc., 604 F.3d at 1305 (the court also noting that contrary to the
district court’s suggestion, the government was not necessarily the best plaintiff in light of limited
resources).
108. See, e.g., W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 104 (3d Cir. 2010);
N.Y. Medscan LLC v. N.Y. Univ. Sch. of. Med., 430 F. Supp. 2d 140, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
109. E.g., Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
central purpose of the antitrust laws . . . is to preserve competition. It is competition—not the
collusive fixing of prices at levels either low or high—that these statutes recognize as vital to the
public interest.”).
110. See, e.g., W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc., 627 F.3d at 104.
111. Id. at 103.
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further alleged that although Highmark acknowledged that the rates were too
low (i.e., below market), Highmark nonetheless refused to raise the rates in light
of its agreement with UPMC. 112 West Penn asserted that it had suffered antitrust
injury as a result of those depressed rates, and Highmark countered that the
depressed rates allowed the insurer to offer lower premiums to subscribers and
to find antitrust injury in this situation would frustrate the purpose of the antitrust
laws, which is to promote consumer welfare. 113 The court rejected Highmark’s
argument, finding instead that Highmark had not, in fact, passed those savings
on to subscribers, and doing so likely would have “diminish[ed] the quality and
availability of hospital services.” 114 Similarly, in a district court case in which
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had engaged in anti-competitive conduct
in the market for Positron Emission Tomography and Computed Tomography
medical scanning equipment, the court was not swayed by the defendant’s
argument that consumers, and therefore competition, had not suffered because
prices had not gone up. 115 Finding that the plaintiffs had adequately pled
antitrust injury, the court stated: “Indeed, in the context of the provision of health
care services for cancer patients, the quality of care is likely to be at least as
important to patients as the price.” 116 Lastly, a district court in New Mexico
recently found antitrust injury by recognizing that an insurer payment of belowmarket reimbursement rates to a provider indicated that insurer’s market power
in the relevant market, explaining that a monopsonist (seller) with market power
is every bit as capable of causing antitrust injury as is a monopolist (buyer). 117
Accordingly, in health care, diminution in quality should be considered in any
discussion of antitrust standing.
d. Twiqbal
The standing inquiry in antitrust cases has been further complicated by the
muddling of standards by lower courts in response to Twombly and Iqbal. 118
Understanding both the development of the antitrust standing rules as well as
how courts are applying them in health care cases particularly since Twiqbal is
essential to filing an effective complaint. Outside of health care, some courts,

112. Id. at 100.
113. Id. at 104.
114. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc., 627 F.3d at 104.
115. N.Y. Medscan LLC v. N.Y. Univ. Sch. of. Med., 430 F. Supp. 2d, 140, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
116. Id.
117. N.M. Oncology & Hematology Consultants, Ltd. v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 54 F.
Supp. 3d 1189, 1205–06 (D.N.M. 2014).
118. See Jacobson & Greer, supra note 82, at 288; see also Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d
953, 965 (9th Cir. 2013); Prime Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Servs. Emps. Int’l Union, No. 11–cv–
2652–GPC–RBB, 2013 WL 3873074, at *12 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 2013), aff’d, 642 F. App’x 665
(9th Cir. 2016).
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including the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have expressly mingled
antitrust injury and the plausibility standard for pleading claims by citing
Twombly and Iqbal to support the proposition that “to state a plausible antitrust
injury, [the plaintiff] must allege facts that rise beyond mere conceivability or
possibility.” 119 Likewise, in health care, some lower courts are mingling
Twombly with antitrust injury. 120 Be that as it may, the Twiqbal growing pains
have not necessarily resulted in a stricter standing requirements for plaintiffs.
For example, in 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
district court’s dismissal of a health care provider’s suit against another provider
and insurer on the grounds that the district court’s application of Twombly
overshot the requirements of that case, including as to antitrust standing. 121 That
early district court decision, written in response to a renewed motion to dismiss
based on the Supreme Court’s rulings in Twombly and Iqbal, was guided by the
defendant’s insistence that the plausibility “requirement includes pleading facts
sufficient to satisfy the antitrust injury requirement.” 122 The court applied a strict
version of plausibility to all facets of the complaint. The Third Circuit
acknowledged the new standard but clarified that it applied equally to all federal
claims and did not impose heightened pleading requirements for antitrust
cases. 123
4. Class Certification
Although private antitrust litigation immediately conjures thoughts of large
class action cases, most cases involving health care services and insurance
premiums are individual actions by competitors, unlike the larger consumer
cases against pharmaceutical companies. The scarcity of class actions in this
arena is likely due to the individualized nature of damages in health care, 124

119. Somers, 729 F.3d at 695 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
120. See, e.g., Prime Healthcare Servs., Inc., 2013 WL 3873074, at *12. In Prime Healthcare
Services, Inc. v. Service Employees International Union, the district court cited Twombly for the
proposition that the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to allege antitrust injury simply by
misquoting Twombly to read that the plaintiff’s “allegations must ‘raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of’ an injury to competition,’” id., whereas Twombly says “raise
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement,” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556 (emphasis added).
121. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We
conclude that it is inappropriate to apply Twombly’s plausibility standard with extra bite in antitrust
and other complex cases.”).
122. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, No. 09CV0480, 2009 WL 3601600, at
*19 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2009), rev’d, 627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
123. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc., 627 F.3d at 98 (“We conclude that it is inappropriate
to apply Twombly’s plausibility standard with extra bite in antitrust and other complex cases.”).
124. See Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1305 (11th
Cir. 2010) (explaining why a patient class might not be the most efficient enforcer).
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which may deter plaintiffs from trying to satisfy the FRCP 23(b)(3) requirement
that issues common to the class will predominate over issues specific to
individual class members in the case. 125 Nonetheless, a few notable class actions
have been filed with some classes certified in this sphere.
Most famous among the class actions in this area may indeed be the most
unlikely: Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem, a merger challenge
to the consummated merger of two hospitals in the Chicago area. 126 Challenges
to mergers by the government, of course, are common, and indeed this private
challenge followed a merger challenge from the FTC. But private plaintiffs
rarely challenge mergers because of timing issues (mergers are typically
challenged when they are still in the planning stages, a time when plaintiffs often
have little information about the deal) and because the typical remedy in a
merger challenge is an injunction. Although the class was certified after being
remanded to the district court in 2013, it still feels like somewhat of a one-off—
plaintiffs have not followed suit en masse to challenge mergers in federal court
either as follow-on cases to FTC merger challenges. Still, the Messner case
contains valuable language for would-be challengers. Given that after a careful
examination of the markets for health care services at issue, including that the
calculation of damages would be affected by factors including “(1) health
service provider contract negotiation, (2) multi-year contract terms, (3) hospital
location, reputation, and quality, and (4) prevalent improvements in the
technology behind certain services,” the court nonetheless concluded that
predominance issues did not preclude class certification. 127 The court explained,
“Individual questions need not be absent. The text of FRCP 23(b)(3) itself
contemplates that such individual questions will be present. The rule requires
only that those questions not predominate over the common questions affecting
the class as a whole.” 128
Even though Messner has not given rise to a wave of follow-on Clayton Actbased merger challenges over the past five years, its language was recently relied
upon by a state court in certifying a class in a challenge to hospital contracting
provisions brought by self-funded payors in California. 129 The court cited the
Seventh Circuit’s suggestion in Messner that “even in the ‘market for hospital
services [which] seems to be particularly complex,’ certification may be

125. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
126. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2012).
127. Justin Boley, Seventh Circuit Vacates Northshore Hospital Antitrust Class Certification
Denial, WEXLER WALLACE LLP (Jan. 17, 2012), https://www.wexlerwallace.com/seventh-circuitvacates-messer-antitrust-class-certification-denial/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2017).
128. Messner, 669 F.3d at 815.
129. Order Granting in Part Motion to Strike, Granting Class Certification, and Setting Case
Management Conference at 9, UFCW & Emp’rs Benefit Tr. v. Sutter Health, Cal. App. Dep’t
Super. Ct (Aug. 14, 2017) (No. CGC 14-538451) (quoting Messner, 669 F.3d at 816).
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proper.” 130 That case, UFCW & Employers Benefit Trust v. Sutter Health,
contains similar allegations to Sidibe v. Sutter Health, which is back in district
court after the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s dismissal for failure to
state a claim but has not yet reached class certification. 131 Sidibe will be the first
case in federal court to seek certification for a class of patients (insurance
subscribers) suing for damages from overcharges related to a hospital’s anticompetitive clauses in insurer contracts and related tying arrangements (as part
of a monopolization scheme)—facts similar to those present in several suits
brought by competitors against hospitals over the past several years. 132
Interestingly, another putative class of plaintiffs has filed a case similar to
UFCW in state court in North Carolina. 133 That case, which is still pre-class
certification, is distinct in that the plaintiffs chose to file in state court, even
though the suit was a follow-on to a DOJ matter. 134
Also currently pending, and in pre-class certification, are two large tracks
(provider plaintiffs and subscriber plaintiffs, respectively) of antitrust class
actions against Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) entities in multi-district
litigation in the Northern District of Alabama. 135 The plaintiffs alleged that
BCBS plans and their association used their market power, derived from being
the dominant insurer in multiple markets, to engage in and profit from the anticompetitive scheme. 136 In the alleged scheme, the individual BCBS plans and
their national association conspired to carve up insurance markets among the
insurers across the country in a nationwide market allocation scheme under
which BCBS plans were allocated a particular market and then would agree not
to compete with other neighboring BCBS plans in at least seventeen states. 137
The two-tracked litigation presents “a unique case where one class (providers)

130. Id.
131. Current Docket, Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 51 F. Supp. 3d 870 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
132. See, e.g., Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1294,
1298 (11th Cir. 2010); Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 859 F.3d 408, 409
(7th Cir. 2017); Marion HealthCare LLC v. S. Ill. Healthcare, 12–CV–00871–DRH–PMF, 2013
WL 4510168, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2013); Arapahoe Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Cigna Healthcare,
Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1262 (D. Colo. 2015).
133. DiCesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No. 16 CVS 16404, 2017 WL 1359599,
at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2017), cert. denied, 804 S.E.2d 541 (N.C. 2017) (mem.).
134. United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 248 F. Supp. 3d 720 (W.D.N.C.
2017).
135. In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 2:13-CV-20000-RDP, 2017 WL 2797267
(N.D. Ala. June 28, 2017).
136. Corrected Consolidated Second Amended Provider Complaint, In re Blue Cross Blue
Shield Antitrust Litig., 26 F. Supp. 3d 1172 (N.D.Ala. 2014) (No. 2:12-cv-02532-RDP).
137. Id. at 131; see also Irina Rodriguez, Moderator, Office of the New York Attorney General,
Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation: Update on the Issues, (May 4, 2016), A.B.A. Antitrust
Sec. L. Rep., at Slide 11, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law
/20160504_at160504_materials.authcheckdam.pdf.
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asserts an antitrust injury (low reimbursement rates) which tends to benefit the
other class (subscribers who may have paid lower premiums as a result),” such
that “[e]ach class will be putting forth evidence that the other class wasn’t
injured.” 138 It is unclear how this potential conflict and other factors will play in
the class certification motions, which will be filed soon.
B.

Substantive Antitrust Challenges
1. Market Definition

As venerated antitrust scholar Professor Hovenkamp observed, “Markets do
not define themselves.” 139 Litigants define markets, and doing so accurately is
an exercise not only in economics but also in advocacy. As former FTC
Chairman Robert Pitofsky stated in 1990, “[A]ntitrust practitioners have long
known that the most important single issue in most enforcement actions—
because so much depends on it—is market definition.” 140 Indeed, market
definition is not only important to public antitrust, but it is also an essential
element and one of the main stumbling blocks in private cases. To plead most
antitrust claims, the plaintiff must define the relevant market in the complaint
along with the reasoning behind the proposed definition. 141 Defining relevant
markets is a highly fact-specific inquiry, 142 which makes doing so in a private
complaint, before the benefit of discovery, particularly challenging. And
defendants may, and often do, move to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim
based on the proposed market definition included in the complaint. 143 Indeed,
market definition is central to most antitrust analyses because “[w]ithout a
definition of [the relevant] market there is no way to measure [a defendant’s]
ability to lessen or destroy competition.” 144
Defining a relevant market is the first step towards convincing the fact finder
that a defendant possesses the legally essential market power over a product or

138. Rodriguez, supra note 137, at Slide 13.
139. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 111 (5th ed. 2016).
140. Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (1990).
141. HOVENKAMP, supra note 139, at 111 n.19.
142. EDWIN S. ROCKEFELLER, THE ANTITRUST RELIGION 41 (2007).
143. See, e.g., Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 51 F. Supp. 3d 870, 872 (N.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d, 667 F.
App’x 641 (9th Cir. 2016); Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13–cv–1509–Orl–
37DAB, 2015 WL 275806, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015); Steward Health Care Sys., LLC v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 997 F. Supp. 2d 142, 149 (D.R.I. 2014); Marion HealthCare, LLC v.
S. Ill. Healthcare & Health Servs. Corp., No. 12–cv–871–SMY–PMF, 2015 WL 3466585, at *1
(S.D. Ill. May 29, 2015).
144. Total Renal Care, Inc. v. W. Nephrology & Metabolic Bone Disease, P.C., No. 08–cv–
00513–CMA–KMT, 2009 WL 2596493, at *6 (quoting Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach.
& Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)).
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a geographic area. This exercise is required to prove claims under the rule of
reason, which is the presumptive judicial rubric for most antitrust claims. 145
Once a market is defined, the plaintiff demonstrates the defendant’s market share
therein—a high share signaling likely market power. Market power is defined
as “the power to raise prices above competitive levels without losing so many
sales that the price increase is unprofitable.” 146 Firms that acquire market power
often engage in anti-competitive conduct beyond just raising prices, including,
e.g., demanding exclusivity provisions in contracts, using market power in one
market to demand better pricing and terms in another market, and/or tying the
sale of other, unwanted products to the sale of a product over which they have
market power. 147 Plaintiffs may sue based on each of these types of conduct, and
market power is a prerequisite for each. 148
Determining the “relevant market” in an antitrust case is a two-part
calculation that “is a collection of products and geographic locations, delineated
as part of an inquiry aimed at making inferences about market power and
anticompetitive effect.” 149 The terms “relevant market” and “antitrust market”
are used “to distinguish these markets from what business executives and
consultants might define for other purposes.” 150 The determination of relevant
market is two-part in that it requires one to define both (1) a product market and
(2) a geographic market, 151 which are distinct, yet intertwined. The product
market is bounded by “the reasonable interchangeability of use or the crosselasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.” 152 Once
determined, the product market serves to define the geographic market, which
“extends to the area of effective competition where buyers can turn for
alternative sources of supply” of the product at issue. 153 Or as one court
explained, “The relevant product market identifies the products or services that
compete with each other, and the relevant geographic market identifies the area

145. Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 2.
146. HOVENKAMP, supra note 139, at 106.
147. See Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV. 59, 72
(2010).
148. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 139, at 106–07. Moreover, market power is an essential
element of many antitrust claims, and, to complicate matters, the degree of market power required
to prove those claims varies. Id. at 107. For example, monopolization requires a high degree of
market power, attempted monopolization requires less market power, and a pre-merger challenge
requires showing a “dangerous probability of acquiring market power” in the future. Id.
149. Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129,
130 (2007).
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 51 F. Supp. 3d 870, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Brown Shoe
Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)), rev’d, 667 F. App’x 641 (9th Cir. 2016).
153. Id. (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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where the competition in the relevant product market takes place.” 154 Or as an
economist might explain, the inquiry looks at consumer substitution patterns to
determine the metes and bounds of both product and geographic markets.
The FTC and DOJ’s jointly issued Horizontal Merger Guidelines are the
source for one of the main tests used in relevant market definition. The test, first
included in the 1982 version of the Guidelines, aids in product as well as
geographic market definition, where it continues to play a role in the new
workshopped models discussed herein. Thus, it is explained here prior to the
other aspects of the development of market definition models. The test aims to
determine consumer substitution patterns, which are the basis for market
definition. Essentially the test asks whether a monopolist in a given market could
raise its prices above the competitive level without losing customers. 155 In
economic terms, the test determines “the smallest grouping of sales for which
the elasticity of demand and supply are sufficiently low that a ‘hypothetical
monopolist’ with 100% of that grouping could profitably reduce output and
increase price substantially above marginal cost.” 156 Put more simply, it checks
whether consumers will substitute for another product in response to a price hike
of a certain size. The test uses the “small but significant non transitory increase
in price” test (“SSNIP”) as its key metric, which is imposed, hypothetically, to
arrive at the smallest relevant market. 157 The size of the price increase used for
the test is small; it is not so small as to not matter at all to consumers but not so
large that it causes buyers to leave or for other sellers to enter the market. 158
Once the smallest grouping is determined, the entity’s market share in that
market is considered to determine whether it has market power. 159 In sum, the
process aims to “find the smallest group of products or firms for which there are
no close substitutes, thus allowing such a hypothetical monopolist to exert
market power.” 160
a. Market Definition in Health Care
Defining relevant markets is crucial to antitrust analysis regardless of
industry; however, the process presents unique challenges in health care due to
the role of health insurers, the non-price reasons for consumer behavior, and the
differentiation in health care services. Whereas most industries present obvious
consumers, in light of the various and overlapping players in health care markets,
154. Id. at 883.
155. HOVENKAMP, supra note 139, at 112.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 111–12.
160. Martin Gaynor et al., A Structural Approach to Market Definition with an Application to
the Hospital Industry 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16656, 2011),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16656.
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who the buyers and sellers are is much less clear. 161 The role of the payor, as
well as the distinctions between private and public payors, has become crucial
to a proper market definition. In addition, a patient’s decision to purchase a
particular health care service is influenced by non-price factors, including the
recommendations of her physician, the network of her health plan or managed
care organization, and the plans offered by her employer. 162 On top of that, a
patient is typically more willing to travel for a non-emergency or elective
service, like a knee replacement, than for an acute one, like an appendectomy,
or may have no choice but to travel for a specialty service that is only available
in a few locations, like an organ transplant.
b. Lessons from Public Enforcement
Market definition, unlike the other challenges discussed in this article, is an
area where the lessons from public enforcement, especially hospital merger
cases, are instructive. As one legal expert presciently put it two decades ago:
“The antitrust treatment of horizontal mergers by the Justice Department and the
Federal Trade Commission is one of the most well developed and closely
scrutinized areas of antitrust law.” 163 However, at the time of this statement
about merger analysis, the FTC may have been experts in most industries but
was losing hospital merger challenges. After losing a series of provider merger
challenges in the mid- and late-1990s, often involving highly concentrated
markets, the FTC undertook to study whether those mergers subsequently
resulted in higher prices, and whether the FTC’s market definition methodology
used to challenge the transactions was to blame. 164 The FTC’s study, aided by
top academic economists who wrote several related papers on the issue,
concluded that those mergers resulted in higher health care prices and the market
definition analyses relied on by the Commission, and often, by the courts, was
faulty. 165 Thereafter, the FTC worked with economists to revise its market
161. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET DEFINITION IN ANTITRUST: THEORY AND
CASE STUDIES 277 (2012).
162. See id. at 277–78.
163. Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST, Spring 1996, at 23.
164. Brill, supra note 15, at 1 n.2 (citing the following FTC losses: Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Hosp. Bd. of Dirs. of Lee Cty., 38 F.3d 1184, 1186 (11th Cir. 1994); Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Butterworth Health Corp.,
946 F. Supp. 1285, 1303 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997);
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999); California
v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d, 217 F.3d 846 (9th Cir.
2000), and amended by 130 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2001)).
165. Brill, supra note 15, at 2, 2 n.5, 2–3 n.6 (citing the following papers: Steven Tenn, The
Price Effects of Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction 22 (Fed. Trade
Comm’n Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 293, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp
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definition analyses for provider mergers and developed new models that have
been the basis of the market definitions used in a string of victories by the
FTC. 166
The key feature of the new ways to define health care markets is that they
consider the roles of the various players in health care markets. Importantly, they
take into account the key distinction between health care and other types of
markets: the role of the health insurer. As explained by economist Gregory
Vistnes in a seminal article in 2000, “Hospital competition is modeled as a twostage game. In the first stage, hospitals compete to be included in a plan’s
hospital network. In the second stage, hospitals compete for a plan’s individual
enrollees, with that competition affected by whether a hospital is in the plan’s
network.” 167 In health care, from the consumer perspective, “patients commit to
a network of medical providers at the time they purchase their health insurance,

293.pdf; Patrick S. Romano & David J. Balan, A Retrospective Analysis of Clinical Quality Effects
of the Acquisition of Highland Park Hospital by Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, 18 INT’L J.
ECON. BUS. 45, 61 (2011); Deborah Haas-Wilson & Christopher Garmon, Hospital Mergers and
Competitive Effects: Two Retrospective Analyses, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 17, 30 (2011); Aileen
Thompson, The Effect of Hospital Mergers on Inpatient Prices: A Case Study of the New HanoverCape Fear Transaction, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 91, 99 (2011); Orley Ashenfelter et al.,
Retrospective Analysis of Hospital Mergers, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 5, 14 (2011); Cory S. Capps
et al., Antitrust Policy and Hospital Mergers: Recommendations for a New Approach, 47
ANTITRUST BULL. 677, 713 (2002); Cory S. Capps et al., The Silent Majority Fallacy of the ElzingaHogarty Criteria: A Critique and New Approach to Analyzing Hospital Mergers 27–28
(Northwestern Univ. Ctr. for the Study of Indus. Org., Working Paper No. 0017, 2001); Cory S.
Capps, From Rockford to Joplin and Back Again: The Impact of Economics on Hospital Merger
Enforcement, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 443, 476 (2014); Cory S. Capps, Economic Analysis of
Hospital Mergers in the 21st Century: A New Economic Toolkit for Assessing Hospital Mergers at
the American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section Conference on Antitrust in Healthcare (May
4, 2012)).
166. Brill, supra note 15, at 3, 3–4 n.9 (citing the following FTC victories: In the Matter of
Inova Health Sys. Found. & Prince William Health Sys., Inc., No. 9326, 2008 WL 2556051, at *1
(Fed. Trade Comm’n June 17, 2008) (dismissing FTC complaint after the parties abandoned the
merger); In the Matter of Reading Health Sys. & Surgical Inst. of Reading, No. 9353, 2012 WL
6188557, at *1 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Dec. 7, 2012) (dismissing FTC complaint after the parties
abandoned the merger); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071,
1095 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (granting FTC preliminary injunction); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney
Health Sys., Inc., 133 U.S. 1003, 1016 (2013); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys.,
Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00058-WLS, at 1 (M.D. Ga. June 5, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/cases/2013/06/130606phoebestip.pdf; Statement of FTC Competition Director
Richard Feinstein on Today’s Announcement by Capella Healthcare that It Will Abandon Its Plan
to Acquire Mercy Hot Springs, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 27, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2013/06/statement-ftc-competition-director-richard-feinstein-todays (last
visited Nov. 12, 2017)).
167. Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 ANTITRUST L.J.
671, 672 (2000).
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but before they know their specific medical needs.” 168 This shift in thinking,
which led analysts to focus on insurer-provider negotiations and consumer
preferences as they related to networks, was instrumental in developing more
accurate ways to define health care markets. Before that, the two main methods
of defining hospital markets in merger enforcement challenges, Elzinga-Hogarty
and Critical Loss Analysis, had been overestimating the size of geographic
markets, causing courts to find lower market shares and lower risks of resulting
market power than they should have. 169 Dissatisfied with the results of the older
analyses, economists developed new market definition models. Some
economists distinguish these models as “structural” in comparison to the
previously used “quantitative” models, 170 which essentially means that they take
into account the role of the health insurer in determining health care prices. 171
As another economist explains, health insurers, which typically charge the
patient only a small portion of the provider’s price, cause patients to be
unresponsive to the true prices of the services they consume, and therefore any
accurate model must take them into account. 172 But that does not mean that
competition does not play a role in determining health care markets. 173 However,
instead of doing so exclusively through consumer choice, competition in health
care markets “does this through the selective contracting practices of insurance
plans, which construct networks that attempt to optimize the tradeoff between
comprehensiveness and costliness.” 174 The substitution analysis then focuses on
the networks, i.e., “[w]hether an insurer includes attractive providers in the
network, and at what price, depends upon the availability of substitutable
providers.” 175 The newer analyses then also consider other stages of

168. Cory Capps et al., Competition and Market Power in Option Demand Markets, 34 RAND
J. ECON. 737, 737–74 (2003).
169. Martin S. Gaynor et al., A Structural Approach to Market Definition with an Application
to the Hospital Industry, 61 J. INDUS. ECON. 243, 248 (2013).
170. Id. at 245, 249, 256.
171. The new models included an analysis called “Willingness-to-Pay,” which is uniquely
tailored to the health care industry based on a bargaining model of the negotiation between
insurance companies and hospitals, a “Betrand model,” and a market power measure for hospitals
called the “Logit Competition Index.” See Christopher Garmon, The Accuracy of Hospital Merger
Screening Methods 6 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 326, 2015) (citing
Robert Town & Gregory Vistnes, Hospital Competition in HMO Networks, 20 J. HEALTH ECON.,
733, 733–53 (2001); Cory Capps et al., Competition and Market Power in Option Demand Markets,
34 RAND J. ECON. 737, 737–63 (2003)); see also David Dranove & Andrew Sfekas, The Revolution
in Health Care Antitrust: New Methods and Provocative Implications, 87 MILBANK Q. 607, 614
(2009).
172. Brett W. Wendling & Nathan E. Wilson, The Importance of Substitution in Assessing
Health Care Provider Mergers, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 515, 516 (2014).
173. See id. at 516–17.
174. Id. at 517.
175. Id.
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competition, including hospitals’ subsequent competition for patients or
insurers’ competition for inclusion in plans offered to employees. 176
Plaintiffs and, correspondingly, courts have been borrowing from these
analyses in defining markets in recent private cases—e.g., in the multi-district
antitrust litigation against BCBS. Paraphrasing Vistnes’ article from 2000, the
court recently explained, “Healthcare providers participate in what is known as
two-stage competition; first they compete for inclusion in the provider networks
of insurers’ plans, and then they compete for patients within a plan.” 177 The
related-but-distinct concept of a “two-sided market” recently received
considerable attention following the Second Circuit’s ruling in United States v.
American Express Co. There, the court reversed the district court’s ruling in
favor of DOJ that American Express’s “non-discrimination provisions” in its
contracts with merchants, which prevented the merchants from steering
consumers to use credit cards with lower fees (to be paid by the merchants), were
anti-competitive. 178 In so ruling, the Second Circuit made clear that market
definition in such markets should not be limited to one side of the market; instead
the analysis must look at the anti-competitive effects on the consumer and not
just the merchant. The admonition that antitrust protects competition (and
consumers) as opposed to competitors is not new, but competitor plaintiffs must
make certain to clarify that their interests align with those of consumers by
showing that the anti-competitive effects extend to consumers in the form of
higher prices or diminished quality. For example, in Methodist, where the
plaintiff hospital argued that exclusive dealing by its competitor with insurers
destroyed competition in the relevant tri-county health care services market,
both the district court and Seventh Circuit were unconvinced that harm extended
beyond the hospital-insurer stage of the market to the hospital-patient stage. 179
Accordingly, the court concluded that the only “victim” was the plaintiff who
had the opportunity to improve and compete against competitor hospitals for
contracts with insurers. 180
Specifically as to product markets, the FTC has long been using “cluster
markets” in which groups of health services are grouped together—a tactic that
176. Petitioner’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 9–10,
Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Corp. 2014 WL 1612838 (No. 13-cv-1054)
(citing Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 671,
672 (2000)).
177. In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-CV-20000-RDP, 2017 WL
2797267, at *5 (N.D. Ala. June 28, 2017). This concept of a “two-sided market” recently received
considerable attention following the Second Circuit’s reversal in United States v. American Express
Co. United States v. American Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that credit
card companies compete for merchants as well as for consumers), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 355
(2017) (mem.).
178. American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 184–86, 206.
179. Methodist Health Servs. Corp., 859 F.3d at 410–11.
180. Id. at 411.
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has become popular in private cases. 181 Of course, due to dissimilarities among
most health care services, the most accurate product markets might be defined
as singular services. 182 No one would argue that bypass surgery and hip
replacement are the same offering. Nonetheless, the procedures both have
features that make them comparable for antitrust analysis, e.g., they are inpatient
procedures typically covered by both Medicare and commercial insurance plans.
Moreover, cases are often about how a defendant’s conduct and market position
affects the prices of multiple types of health care services, and defining a distinct
market for each would be cumbersome and confusing. And unlike in most
industries where “cluster markets are most often used as a convenience and not
because they are analytically rigorous,” 183 the existence of networks means that
goods are already clustered. Cluster markets make considerable sense in an
industry characterized by network effects, i.e., as the number and type of health
care providers included in the network increases, the more valuable the network
is to consumers. 184
c. Market Definition at the Pleading Stage
Private enforcement differs from public enforcement in the degree to which
defining markets at the pleading stage matters. As explained above, when the
FTC files a challenge to a hospital merger, it typically does so with the benefit
of pre-merger discovery and after having had a chance to do a full economic
analysis of the merger’s potential effects on competition. In contrast, in a private
case, the plaintiff usually has insufficient information about anti-competitive
effects until the post-pleading discovery process begins. Accordingly, surviving
a motion to dismiss is crucial. And because pleading standards have become
more difficult to satisfy, this is no simple task.
d. The Twiqbal Effect on Market Definition
Defining relevant markets is a highly fact-specific inquiry, which makes
doing so in a complaint, before the benefit of discovery, particularly challenging.
And because market definition is a factual as opposed to a legal issue, it cannot
be resolved at the pleading stage. 185 Yet, in light of Twombly and Iqbal’s higher
pleading standards, plaintiffs treat market definition as a discovery-phase fact
issue at their peril. Twiqbal’s plausibility standard has crept (albeit
181. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 467–68 (7th
Cir. 2016) (collecting hospital merger cases); Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13CV-1509-ORL, 2015 WL 275806, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015); In re Blue Cross Blue Shield
Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 2797267, at *5.
182. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 161, at 280–81.
183. Id. at 280.
184. See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT: 23 MAJOR TRENDS IN
ANTITRUST LAW 84 (2017) (discussing the network effects associated with the credit card industry).
185. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482 (1992).
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inconsistently) into courts’ evaluations of relevant market definitions at the early
stages of cases over the past several years. Even before the Twiqbal holdings,
some courts already used a plausibility standard to evaluate market definition at
the pleading stage. 186 Back then, many courts used “plausible” and “viable”
interchangeably to describe the standard for relevant market definition at
pleading. 187 Now with Twiqbal in effect, some commentators have noted the
more express application of the “plausibility” standard to the non-conspiracy
elements of antitrust claims, including market definition. 188
In reality post-Twiqbal courts have required varying degrees of plausibility
in regard to market definition in health care cases. Some courts have demanded
Twiqbal-style allegations of plausible relevant markets, 189 while others apply
more forgiving standards. 190 There are three main categories of such cases: (1)
cases in which courts expressly require that plaintiffs plead “plausibility” under
Twiqbal;191 (2) cases that more generally cite to the Twiqbal standard as
applying to all of the claims, but not expressly to market definition (and even in
some cases citing to pre-Twiqbal cases in the market definition analysis); 192 and
(3) cases in which the plaintiff seems to luck out by drawing a judge whose
standard for market definition appears closer to notice pleading than either preTwiqbal analyses that call for “plausibility” or “viability,” or post-Twiqbal

186. E.g., Ferguson Med. Grp., L.P. v. Mo. Delta Med. Ctr., No. 1:06 CV 8 CDP, 2006 WL
2225454, at *3, *5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2006).
187. E. & G. Gabriel v. Gabriel Bros., No. 93 CIV. 0894 (PKL), 1994 WL 369147, at *2–3
(S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1994). Theatre Party Assocs., Inc. v. Shubert Org., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 150, 154,
156 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss where plaintiff failed to allege
“viable” or “plausible” relevant market).
188. Stephen P. Safranski, “Plausibility” and the Non-Conspiracy Elements of Antitrust
Claims, ROBINS KAPLAN, LLP (June 5, 2014), http://www.robinskaplan.com/resources/articles/
plausibility-and-the-non-conspiracy-elements-of-antitrust-claims (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
189. E.g., Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 51 F. Supp. 3d 870, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d, 667 F.
App’x 641 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Safranski, supra note 188 (“Sidibe embodies the level of
precision that federal courts may now demand in antitrust litigation under the Twombly plausibility
standard when it comes to pleading the existence of a relevant market.”).
190. See, e.g., Steward Health Care Sys., LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 997 F. Supp.
2d 142, 163 (D.R.I. 2014) (“Geographic markets need not be alleged or proven with ‘scientific
precision,’ nor be defined ‘by metes and bounds as a surveyor would lay off a plot of ground.’ The
complaint need only present sufficient information to plausibly suggest the contours of the relevant
geographic market.”) (quoting United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d
665, 673 (E.D. Mich. 2011)).
191. E.g., Sidibe, 51 F. Supp. 3d at 882; Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health,
591 F.3d 591, 596 (8th Cir. 2009); N.M. Oncology & Hematology Consultants, Ltd. v. Presbyterian
Healthcare Servs., 54 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1199 (D.N.M. 2014).
192. E.g., Steward Health Care Sys., LLC, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 151, 160; Powderly v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of N.C., No. 3:08-CV-00109-W, 2008 WL 4129767, at *1–2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 4,
2008).
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“plausibility” tests. 193 Under the circumstances, plaintiffs should assume a court
will use greater scrutiny to examine pleading stage relevant market definitions.
In one notable recent district court case, Sidibe, the court’s dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ claims on a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint was based
entirely their failure to allege plausible relevant geographic markets under
Twiqbal. 194 That case was reversed and remanded to district court when the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided, based on a 2008 case contemporaneous
to Twombly but pre-Iqbal Ninth Circuit case, that fewer facts were required of
plaintiffs in market definition at the pleading stage. 195 However, the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion was unpublished and may be cold comfort for plaintiffs who
opt to avoid Twiqbal plausibility when pleading relevant markets.
e. Recent Trends in Product Market Definition
Product market can be a subject of greater contention in private enforcement
cases in health care than in public hospital merger challenges because the FTC
and merging hospitals so often agree on the relevant product market (and conflict
on geographic market). 196 Yet, like in public enforcement cases, product market
is less contentious than the more often dispositive issue of geographic markets,
and fewer cases tend to be dismissed on this issue early on in litigation. 197 Like
the FTC and DOJ, most plaintiffs also distinguish health services paid for with
government insurance from those paid for with commercial insurance in
defining product markets, 198 but this issue has come up in some recent cases.
For example, in Marion HealthCare, LLC v. Southern Illinois HealthCare, the
193. E.g., Am. Med. Ass’n v. United Healthcare Corp., 588 F. Supp. 2d 432, 447 (S.D.N.Y.
2008); Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Penn Presbyterian Med. Ctr., No. CIV. 11-1290 RMB KMW,
2011 WL 6935276, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2011); Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No.
6:13–cv–1509–Orl–37DAB, 2015 WL 275806, at *11–12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015).
194. Sidibe, 51 F. Supp. 3d at 883, 886–87 (noting that the district court explained it was “not
requiring heightened pleading”).
195. Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 667 F. App’x 641, 643 (9th Cir. 2016).
196. Gaynor et al., supra note 160, at 3, 3 n.6, but see Promedica Health System, Inc. v. Fed.
Trade Comm’n, 749 F.3d 559, 565 (6th Cir. 2014), a case in which the product market was a subject
of contention.
197. Recent cases where defendants have challenged a product market in health care as too
narrow include a case where the court found the product market should extend to all medical
services provided to inmates in all locked facilities, not just prisons, Colonial Med. Grp., Inc. v.
Catholic Health Care W., 444 Fed. App’x 937, 938 (9th Cir. 2011), and a case in which the district
court conflated the product market with the geographic market, demanding that the “product
market” should extend to similar products in other geographic areas, Rocky Mountain Med. Mgmt.,
LLC v. LHP Hosp. Grp., Inc., No. 4:13–cv–00064–EJL, 2013 WL 5469890, at *14 (D. Idaho Sept.
30, 2013).
198. See, e.g., Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., No. 1:13–cv–01054–
SLD–JEH, 2015 WL 1399229, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015); In re Blue Cross Blue Shield
Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-CV-20000-RDP2017, 2017 WL 2797267, at *5 (N.D. Ala. June 28,
2017).
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plaintiff’s product market definition included only hospital services paid for by
commercial insurers but not government payors. 199 The district court granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that a product market that included only
hospital services paid for by commercial insurance, but not those same services
when paid for by Medicare or Medicaid, was implausibly narrow. 200 In doing
so, the court relied on the Eighth Circuit’s 2009 decision in Little Rock
Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, a case that declined to distinguish health
care services markets based on payors, reasoning that, from the doctor’s
perspective, the consumer’s method of payment was irrelevant and therefore
could not be the basis of a market definition. 201 Those cases appear to be the
exception, however, and other courts in contemporaneous cases have limited
product markets to health care services purchased by commercial payors despite
defendants’ arguments for all payors’ inclusion. 202
Plaintiffs have also been successful in using the cluster market approach in
health care. For example, the court accepted this strategy in the recently settled
case of Omni Healthcare in which physician groups sued a health care
corporation comprised of a hospital and an insurance plan, alleging the health
care giant used its market power, gained in part from anti-competitive mergers,
to obtain exclusive referral arrangements aimed at eliminating competitors. 203
In declining to exclude the plaintiff’s expert economist’s report, which clustered
health services into product markets, the court explained that “[t]he Supreme
Court has also recognized that there is ‘no barrier to combining in a single
market a number of different products or services where that combination
reflects commercial realities.’” 204 Even more recently, a court in the antitrust
199. Marion HealthCare, LLC v. S. Ill. HealthCare, No. 12–CV–00871–DRH–PMF, 2013 WL
4510168, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2013). The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, id.
at *11–12, and after refiling the case with a product market definition broadened to include all
payors, several counts of the complaint survived a subsequent motion to dismiss, Marion
HealthCare, LLC v. S. Ill. Healthcare & Health Servs. Corp., No. 12–cv–871–SMY–PMF, 2015
WL 3466585, at *8 (S.D. Ill. May 29, 2015).
200. Marion HealthCare, LLC, 2013 WL 4510168, at *10–11.
201. Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 597–98 (8th Cir. 2009).
202. See, e.g., Methodist Health Services Corporation’s Opposition in Response in Opposition
at 9–10, Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., No. 13-cv-1054 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 11,
2014) (relying on Economist Gregory Vistnes’s work and In re ProMedica Health System, Inc. to
argue that exclusion of government payors resulted in the most accurate product market definition
because the prices government payors pay for medical services do not significantly constrain those
paid by commercial insurers, who negotiate their rates with providers separately and individually);
In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 2797267, at *9; Steward Health Care Sys.,
LLC v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of R.I., 997 F. Supp. 2d 142, 161 (D.R.I. 2014) (finding that a
product market with only commercial payors was plausible because of lack of interchangeability
with Medicare- and Medicaid-purchased health care services).
203. Omni Healthcare Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 613CV1509ORL37DAB, 2016 WL
4272164, at *2, *22 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2016).
204. Id. at *8 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572 (1966)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

40

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 11:5

litigation against BCBS noted that a “cluster market” is “a concept widely
accepted in healthcare antitrust cases and scholarly economic analyses.” 205
Because of the existence of networks in health care, this clustering finds a natural
fit in health care product markets. In this sense, cluster markets are more a
market reality than a litigant’s convenience and are likely to continue to gain
traction as the plaintiff’s preferred methodology for product market definition.
f.

Recent Trends in Geographic Market Definition

Recent antitrust health care cases also highlight the aspects of geographic
market definition that courts appear to be most focused on at the pleading stage.
Of course, courts demand good faith and are inclined to dismiss a complaint
when they determine that a plaintiff’s proposed geographic market definition is
more a gerrymandered, results-driven presentation of the facts rather than an
accurate picture of the market at issue. 206 Beyond that, plaintiffs must frame their
geographic market definition, just as with product market definition, 207 in terms
of substitutes available to the buyer. This distinction is not new, and the notion
of available substitutes was articulated in the seminal (but non-health care) case
of Brown Shoe in 1962. 208 Once the product market is determined, it serves to
define the geographic market, which “extends to the area of effective
competition where buyers can turn for alternative sources of supply” of the
product at issue. 209
In a number of private antitrust cases over the past several years, court
decisions have favored plaintiffs’ geographic market definitions that described
where customers could receive health care services over those that described
where patients actually received services. In a 2002 monopolization and tying
case before the Fifth Circuit, the court explained that the plaintiff’s expert had
defined the defendant hospital’s service area as coextensive with its geographic
market instead of “where people could practicably go for inpatient services.” 210
This defect was fatal, as the court explained, “‘trade area is not necessarily the
relevant geographic market for purposes of antitrust analysis’ because

205. In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 2797267, at *5.
206. See, e.g., Ferguson Med. Grp., L.P. v. Mo. Delta Med. Ctr., No. 1:06CV8 CDP, 2006 WL
2225454, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2006); Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA, 591 F.3d at 599.
207. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 8
(2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf. Recall
that product market definition involves “demand substitution factors,” or “customers’ ability and
willingness to substitute away from one product to another in response to a price increase or a
corresponding non-price change such as a reduction in product quality or service.” Id. at 7.
208. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
209. Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 51 F. Supp. 3d 870, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Tanaka v. Univ.
of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)), rev’d, 667 F. App’x 641 (9th Cir. 2016).
210. Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Tangipahoa Par., 309
F.3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 2002).
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geographic market evidence must take into account ‘where consumers could
practicably go, not on where they actually go.’” 211 In 2014, the district court in
Sidibe articulated the same reason for dismissing the plaintiffs’ geographic
market definition—the Dartmouth Atlas’ hospital service areas (routinely used
in the health care insurance industry)—saying the definition did not work “for
antitrust purposes” because the relevant geographic market should encompass
the area where patients could go, not just where they typically already did go. 212
But that case was reversed on appeal by the Ninth Circuit. 213 And in the BCBS
multi-district litigation, a court recently accepted Dartmouth Atlas Hospital
Referral Regions and Dartmouth Atlas Hospital Service Areas as relevant
geographic markets “for the product market defined as the purchase of goods
and services from healthcare facilities by commercial buyers.” 214 Accordingly,
the notion of where a plaintiff could go versus does go may be evolving as courts
continue to consider how the role of the insurer affects how health care markets
function. In other words, the network controls the geographic scope of markets
more so than in other antitrust cases where consumers could act on preferences
without such constraints. Plaintiffs who focus on the geographic boundaries
related to how the network directs patients may therefore be the most successful
in defining markets.
2. Claim Selection
Determining which claims to include in one of these cases based on cases
already filed is not exactly a scientific exercise. For one, the number of cases
filed is small. And of the cases filed, many settle before their claims are
litigated. 215 It is often easier to identify losing strategies than winning ones, but
even then all that can be learned from a lower court opinion is how one district
court judge saw the issue. For example, many of the cases involving providers
and insurers involve similar facts: smaller provider sues larger provider(s) (and
often one or more insurer) for keeping it from competing in the market for
certain health care services in a given location. Such a case could be styled as a
conspiracy to boycott under Sherman Act Section 1, an exclusive dealing
arrangement under Sherman Act Section 1 or Section 2 or Clayton Act Section
3, and/or monopolization or a conspiracy to monopolize under Sherman Act
211. Id. (quoting Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 208 F.3d 655, 662 (8th
Cir. 2000)).
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215. See, e.g., Joint Stipulation of Final Dismissal, Arapahoe Surgery Center, LLC v. Cigna
Healthcare, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (D. Colo. 2016) (No. 1:13-CV-03422); Order of Dismissal
with Prejudice, Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., 2015 WL 275806 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22,
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Section 2, as well as anti-competitive under the relevant state antitrust statutes,
and so on. The plaintiff’s selections determine whether the case will be
examined under the per se doctrine or the rule of reason, what effects must be
shown including whether the plaintiff must show it was foreclosed from dealing
in the relevant market, and more. Of course, each case has its own specific facts
(e.g., a plaintiff may have evidence of an outright conspiracy in one case,
whereas another plaintiff may only have the option of suing based on the
contracts at issue), as well as other unique circumstances like the political
environment involved and the judge assigned. Furthermore, a plaintiff’s
attempts to choose claims more favorable to the plaintiff’s case than the court
believes the facts provide for can be fatal, as was the case in Elizabeth Place,
where the court essentially held that the plaintiffs had tried to shoehorn a case
about vertical restraints (restrictions on agreements between providers and
payors, which would require more evidence of anti-competitive effects through
a rule of reason analysis) into a horizontal conspiracy claim, that they might
stand to win under per se treatment. 216 Accordingly, plaintiffs are ultimately left
to determine which claims most accurately reflect the facts of their cases,
including the realities of the markets in which they buy or sell health care
services or insurance. As courts continue to develop a more sophisticated
understanding of how these markets work, plaintiffs will likely be rewarded for
such a strategy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Private antitrust enforcement is an indispensable tool in the fight against
market power and high prices in health care. Unlike public enforcement, private
enforcement allows health care entities to police their own markets and
consumers to seek redress from the effects of market power among providers
and insurers. Besides, public enforcement is incapable of doing the entire job
due to limited resources and or a lack of political will. Despite criticisms that
private suits are self-interested and therefore anti-competitive, these lawsuits can
be both self-interested and pro-competitive. The antitrust laws were written to
take advantage of private plaintiffs’ incentives and information. Properly
optimized, private antitrust enforcement has the potential to provide a truly
effective complement to public antitrust enforcement as a means to addressing
health care prices.
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2016).

